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Abstract
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1 Introduction
By historical standards, the international stock market crash of March 2020 associated with the first
major wave of COVID-19 pandemic due to a novel coronavirus appears exceptional, even if compared to
other episodes of infection and disease spread. Using measurements of daily stock market swings based
on contemporary journalistic accounts going back to 1900, Baker et al. (2020) show that the U.S. stock
market volatility during the first half of 2020 is unprecedented. It surpasses that of the Great Depression,
the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), and the Spanish Flu pandemic. The realized stock market volatility
(VIX) in the USA during the first spell of the COVID-19 pandemic is in the same ballpark as that of the
Great Crash of 1929, Great Depression Crash in 1933, and Black Monday Crash in 1987. Until March
2020, when they were activated 4 times, U.S. market-wide circuit breakers had been activated only once,
in 1997 (Li and Yao, 2020). In other countries, volatility also increased dramatically (Cepoi, 2020; Okorie
and Lin, 2020; Zhang et al., 2020).
Recent research shows that firms and industries are affected differently and that non-linear dynamics
and responses are typical. Ramelli and Wagner (2020) provide a timeline of the initial stages of the
epidemic and propose a breakdown in 3 phases: Incubation (January 2 to January 17), Outbreak (January
20 to February 21), and Fever (February 24 to March 20). They show that market analysts started paying
attention to the epidemic only during the Outbreak period. They connect stock prices to corporate
features and argue that the largest impact of the epidemic has been on companies with low cash and high
refinancing risks and leverage. Pagano et al. (2020) argue that the stock returns of firms more resilient to
social distancing tend to outperform those of firms with less resilience. Alfaro et al. (2020) demonstrate
that day-to-day changes in the predictions of standard models of infectious disease forecast changes in
aggregate stock returns during the 2003 SARS outbreak in Hong Kong and the COVID-19 pandemic
in the USA. They document that industries more exposed to virus transition (such as entertainment)
have experienced deeper stock market declines. Using data on futures on dividends, Gormsen and Koijen
(2020) provide evidence of a link between the impact of COVID-19 and the revision of growth and
dividend expectations in the USA and Europe. Croce et al. (2020) study the effect of news shocks related
to local epidemic conditions and information diffusion through Twitter, and find a large market price of
contagion risk.
We outline a statistical and descriptive analysis and use a novel testing approach pioneered by Phillips
and Yu (2011) and Phillips et al. (2015) to detect episodes of mildly explosive behavior (statistical insta-
bility) in 18 major stock market indices between November 1, 2019 and May 31, 2020. This method has
been used to identify bubbles in real estate markets (Pavlidis et al., 2016), detect distress in fixed income
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markets (Contessi et al., 2020), and develop trading strategies based on bubbles detection (Milunovich
et al., 2019).
First, we document the extent of instability and distress across stock markets. Second, we identify
periods of instability in these markets. Third, we test for transmission of instability from market to
market. We find evidence of instability in all countries, especially between the end of February and the
beginning of April. We show that instability is associated with a sudden collapse of stock markets, while
the recovery is smoother. The source of this worldwide instability is the Chinese crash, detected at the
end of January. We provide evidence of statistical transmission of instability from China to all other
economies during the first three months of 2020.
2 Data and Empirical Methods
We use a daily dataset (5-day weeks) of 18 major stock market indices. These indices exhibit the largest
capitalization levels in the world and belong to countries that have been impacted by the epidemic. The
adopted methods identify and date-stamp periods of statistical instability in stock markets and detect
instability migration from market to market. We consider stock market indices for the following areas:
1. South-East Asia: China (SSEC, Shanghai SE Composite Index), Hong Kong (HSI, Hang Seng
Composite Index), Singapore (FTFSTA, Singapore FTSE All-Share Index), South Korea (KS100,
Korea KOSPI-100), Taiwan (TSE50, Taiwan FTSE/TSE-50 Price Index), and Thailand (SET100,
Thailand SET-100 Index);
2. Europe: France (FCHI, Paris CAC-40 Index), Germany (GDAXIP, Germany DAX Price Index),
Italy (MIBCI3, Milan COMIT 30 Index), Spain (IBEX, Madrid SE IBEX-35), Sweden (OMXS30,
OMX Stockholm-30 Index), and Switzerland (SPIX, Switzerland Price Index);
3. Other Advanced Economies: Australia (AXJO, S&P/ASX 200 Composite Index), UK(FTAS, UK
FTSE All-Share Index), USA (DJA3, Dow Jones Composite Average - Actual - Index), and Japan
(N500, Nikkei 500 Index);
4. Other Emerging Economies: Brazil (IBX, Rio de Janeiro IBX-100 Index) and India (NSEI, NSE-50
Index).
Some of these countries have multiple indices. We choose the most widely used in the literature. All
series start on November 1, 2019 and end on May 29, 2020. We run our methods on the full samples.
Consistent with the growing COVID-19/asset pricing literature, we describe empirical results starting
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from January 1, 2020 – the day after the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission in China reports a cluster
of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, Hubei Province.
2.1 Testing for Mild Explosiveness
The statistical detection of mild explosiveness evolves around a right-tail variation of the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF ) test and is based on a test equation, yt = µ + δyt−1 +
∑p
i=1 φi∆yt−i + εt. yt is a
time series of interest (a stock market index); µ is an intercept; p is the maximum number of lags (3
daily observations); and εt is an error term. The null and alternative hypotheses are H0 : δ = 1 and
H1 : δ > 1, respectively. The original sample interval of T daily observations is rescaled to the interval
[0, 1]. An ordinary least squares estimate of δ over the (rescaled) sample [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, 1] is denoted as
δr1,r2 . The corresponding ADF test statistic is ADFr1,r2 . rw = r2 − r1 is the (fractional) window size
of the regression. The Generalized Supremum ADF (GSADF ) test comes from a recursive procedure
in which ADF test statistics are calculated over (overlapping) windows that roll over a forward moving
and expanding sample. At each iteration, we estimate the test equation over a different (rescaled) sample
and compute an ADF test statistic. The GSADF test statistic is the supremum of ADFr1,r2 over all
possible windows. GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
{ADFr1,r2}, where r0 is the smallest sample window width
fraction (10%) and 1 is the largest window width fraction (full sample) in the recursion.
We first generate a random sample of T observations from a null model, a random walk with an
asymptotically negligible drift, yt = dT
−η + θyt−1 + et, et ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, θ = d = η = 1. η is a localizing
parameter that determines the size of the drift as T −→ ∞ and et is a normal error term. Then, we
recursively estimate the test equation over the sample generated by the null model using the aforemen-
tioned recursive mechanism and store the GSADF test statistic. First and second steps are repeated
1000 times. The p-value for the sample test statistic is p (τ̂) = 11000
∑1000
j=1 I (τj > τ̂). τ̂ is the sample
GSADF statistic; I (·) is an indicator function such that I (τj > τ̂) = 1 if τj > τ̂ and I (τj > τ̂) = 0 if
τj 6 τ̂ ; and {τj}1,000j=1 is the sequence of simulated GSADF statistics.
2.2 Date-Stamping Periods of Mild Explosiveness
If the null hypothesis is rejected, origination and termination of mild explosiveness are estimated by a
recursive ADF test on backward expanding samples based on an algorithm that mirrors the aforemen-
tioned procedure. The end point of each sample, r2, now moves backwards. The start point varies from 0
to r2−r0. For each r2, we derive a sequence of ADF test statistics, {ADFr1,r2}r1∈[0,r2−r0] and a Backward
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Supremum ADF test statistic, BSADFr2 (r0) = sup
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
{ADFr1,r2}.
r̂e = inf
r2∈[0,1]
{
r2 : BSADFr2 (r0) > cv
βT
r2
}
is the beginning of mild explosiveness as a fraction of the
full sample. cvβTr2 is the 100 (1− βT ) % critical value of the BSADF test statistic based on Tr2 ob-
servations. βT ∈ (0, 1) indicates the level of the test (10%). The termination of mild explosiveness is
r̂f = inf
r2∈[r̂e,1]
{
r2 : BSADFr2 (r0) < cv
βT
r2
}
. The origination (termination) date is the observation at which
the BSADF statistic exceeds (falls below) the critical value of the BSADF statistic. GSADF test and
BSADF test statistics are related to each other as GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
{BSADFr2 (r0)}.
2.3 Migration of Mild Explosiveness
Let θX (τ) be the coefficient of an autoregressive model with an intercept term for {Xt}τ=Trt=1 , with
r ∈ [r0, 1]. θX (τ) is estimated by ordinary least squares as θ̂X (τ) over a recursively increasing window
with a fixed starting date located as early as possible in the sample. θY (τ) and θ̂Y (τ) are defined in the
same way. Time variation in θX (τ) possibly means structural changes originating from turmoil or panic.
When mild explosiveness reaches its peak in Xt (a maximum in the sequence of BSADF test statistics),
we can test for its transmission to Yt. Under the alternative of transmission, mild explosiveness emerges
in Yt as it fades away in Xt. Therefore, the generating mechanism of Yt has a recursive autoregressive
coefficient, θY (τ), that (i) transitions from a unit root to a mildly explosive root and (ii) is negatively
associated with the recursive autoregressive coefficient of Xt, θX (τ).
If the procedure has identified mild explosiveness in Xt between τ̂eX = T r̂eX and τ̂fX = T r̂fX and
in Yt between τ̂eY = T r̂eY and τ̂fY = T r̂fY , assume that the two sequences of BSADF statistics for Xt
and Yt peak at times τ̂ρX = T r̂ρX and τ̂ρY = T r̂ρY , respectively, with r̂ρY > r̂ρX . Let m = τ̂ρY − τ̂ρX =
T r̂ρY −T r̂ρX be the number of daily observations in (τ̂ρX , τ̂ρY ]. Migration can be detected by estimating
[
θ̂Y (τ)− 1
]
= β0 + β1
[
θ̂X (τ)− 1
] τ − τ̂ρX
m
+ ut, τ = T r̂ρX + 1, ..., T r̂ρY ,
over the period of gradual disappearance of mild explosiveness in Xt and the coincident emergence of
explosiveness in Yt. An asymptotically conservative and consistent test for H0 : β1 = 0 vs H1 : β1 < 0 is
based on a standard normal test statistic,
Zβ =
β̂1
L (m)
, where
1
L (m)
+
L (m)
T ε
−→ 0, as T −→∞ for any ε > 0,
for some slowly varying function L (m), such as a log10 (m), with a > 0 and m = O (T ).
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3 Empirical Results
We discuss the outcomes of a battery of tests of mild explosiveness on the stock market indices in the
sample, describe the identified periods of mildly explosive behavior (length of at least 5 days) in each
country, and report the results of tests of instability migration from China to all other countries.
Mildly Explosive Behavior. Table 1 reports the outcomes of the GSADF tests. All stock markets
exhibit statistical instability. Evidence of mild explosiveness is pervasive. It is detected at the 1% level
in all cases but Hong Kong, where instability is found at the 5% level. Instability peaks in China first,
on January 24, the day after the central government imposes a lockdown in Wuhan and other cities in
Hubei. China is followed by Thailand, whose market instability peaks one month later, on February 26,
and then again (with a peak about the same size as the first) between March 16 and 17.
All other stock market indices exhibit peaks of mild explosiveness between March 12 and March 23,
shortly after the World Health Organization makes the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized
as a pandemic (March 11). The first phases of a harsh lockdown begin in Italy on February 21, but are
limited to selected municipalities in the northern part of the country. Lockdown measures are extended
to most of Northern Italy on March 8, and to the rest of the country and most of the economy on March
9. By then, other countries – such as France, Spain, and the UK – have experienced the effects of the
epidemic and would lockdown the economy soon. The 12 days between March 12 and 23 represent the
core of the COVID-19 outbreak around the world, as many countries introduce more stringent measures
and impose broad stay-at-home orders.
Table 1 shows a clear separation across geographic regions. After China and Thailand, peaks of insta-
bility occur in Europe. Instability simultaneously peaks on March 12 in the 7 European countries in the
sample (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK). Brazil and Japan follow suit,
with their peaks of instability occurring on March 16. Peaks of instability contemporaneously emerge on
March 19 in the remaining 4 South-East Asian countries in the sample (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Ko-
rea, and Taiwan), in Australia, and in India. Finally, with an evident lag, a peak of instability appears in
the USA on March 23. In all cases but Thailand and China, these peaks occur almost coincidentally with
(or a few days earlier than) the lowest levels attained by the stock market indices as they collapse, and
right before they start bouncing back. Such lowest index values are all clustered between March 16 and 23.
Periods of Mild Explosiveness. A mildly explosive collapse (a fall in the stock market index accom-
panied by statistical instability) starts on January 23 in China. The drop in the SSEC index occurs from
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a local maximum of 3096 (January 20) to a local minimum of 2747 (January 24, the day before the start
of the Chinese New Year, during the first days of which no trading occurs in Chinese financial markets).
Some evidence of the emergence of a mildly explosive collapse in Thailand appears on February 24.
Similar evidence can be dated to the end of February in most other countries in the sample. On the one
hand, stock market instability related to COVID-19 appears short-lived in China, maybe because of the
timely beginning of the Chinese New Year. Chinese markets recover quickly, probably thanks to rapid
and heavy-handed government interventions. On the other hand, instability seems to last longer in the
other countries. It keeps developing until about the last week of March in Australia, the USA, Hong
Kong, Spain, South Korea, Italy, France, Germany, the UK, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and Taiwan;
and the first week of April in Singapore, India, and Thailand. Some instability is present at the end of
May in Brazil and, maybe, Japan. During their respective worst periods of mildly explosive collapses, all
countries experience pronounced declines in their stock markets, ranging from −9.7% and −10.2% (USA
and Hong Kong, respectively) to −28.9% and −33.1% (Australia and Spain).1 Except Brazil and possi-
bly Japan, the countries in the sample are on a path of non-explosive recovery between April and May.
In some of these economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Sweden, Australia, Japan, and the USA),
the recovery is proportionally more apparent. This evidence is reported in Table 2 and Figures 1, 2, and 3.
Transmission. All countries experience other, less prolonged, episodes of mild explosiveness over the
period under investigation. Given their temporal location, these episodes are likely not related to the
development of the outbreak and the spread of the virus. Transmission of statistically unstable behavior
related to COVID-19 is tested from the Chinese stock market to all other markets in the sample. As
Table 3 shows, statistical evidence of migration of mild explosiveness from China (at its peak on January
24) to all countries is strong and extensive. Such empirical evidence suggests the existence of spill-over
effects and the spread of market disturbances and financial contagion across major world stock markets
during the first quarter of 2020. Heterogeneous country-level economic policies are likely to have hetero-
geneous effects on the shape and speed of recovery in each financial market. An aspect to consider for
future research is the existence of financial contagion across countries and its extent during the pandemic.
Comparison with the GFC. Unlike the COVID-19 economic crisis (which is initially triggered by
a supply shock and then exacerbated by a combination of demand and financial shocks), the GFC is
primarily caused by a financial shock that originates in the U.S. credit market in late July 2007 (Contessi
et al., 2020). We test for mild explosiveness in the stock market indices of all countries in the sample
1Relative declines are computed between the day before the beginning of instability and the last day of instability.
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using daily data between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009 (see Table 4). In the United States, the
epicenter of international instability in those months, the main GFC-related episode of mild explosiveness
starts on September 29, 2008 and persists until December 24, 2008, with an overall decline of 25%. The
impact of the crisis on the U.S. stock market is direct and immediate, although characterized by marked
heterogeneity between sectors (Pagano et al., 2020). Mildly explosive stock market collapses also occur in
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Germany, Sweden, and Japan between September
and December 2008. The relative magnitudes of these declines are comparable to those that are recorded
in the first half of 2020. However, instability (i) does not appear to be as synchronized internationally
during the GFC as during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic; and (ii) is heterogeneous across
countries in terms of duration. The remaining stock market indices do not exhibit statistically significant
instability during the period under investigation.
4 Conclusions
We provide one of the first empirical investigations of the development and transmission of instability in
stock markets in a cross-section of 18 major countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find robust
evidence of instability and crashes spreading from China to other countries (especially European coun-
tries) during the most dramatic phases of circulation of the pandemic. The evidence is suggestive of an
initially slow diffusion of stock market distress followed by rapid collapses, consistent with epidemiological
models of diffusion of expectations.
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Right-Tail Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests on Stock Market Indices
GSADF Test Statistic Date of Lowest Index Value
3.989479*** 03/23/2020
2.678192** 03/23/2020
6.017338*** 03/23/2020
4.48037*** 03/19/2020
5.54893*** 03/19/2020
4.477174*** 03/23/2020
5.216905*** 03/18/2020
4.902948*** 03/18/2020
4.667604*** 03/16/2020
5.053606*** 03/16/2020
3.431591*** 03/23/2020
3.170666*** 03/23/2020
3.753219*** 03/23/2020
4.129232*** 03/16/2020
4.525387*** 03/23/2020
4.297499*** 03/23/2020
3.392524*** 03/23/2020
6.211307*** 03/23/2020
Notes. In this table, we report the outcomes of the right-tail ADF tests that we run individually on each index. We find
statistical evidence of mildly explosive behavior in all of them. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; ** denotes
statistical significance at the 5% level. We use the Schwarz Information Criterion to select optimal lag in the test regressions. 3
days is maximum lag length considered when performing automatic lag length selection. Critical values are simulated using
1,000 replications. Initial window size: 10% of the full sample. Critical values (all indices; AXJO and IBX excluded): 3.0410
(99%), 2.3986 (95%), 2.0892 (90%). Critical values (AXJO): 3.1138 (99%), 2.3504 (95%), 2.0319 (90%). Critical values
(IBX): 3.1005 (99%), 2.4285 (95%), 2.1101 (90%). Samples: 11/01/2019 - 05/29/2020. Peak Date: day on which the GSADF
test statistic is located (i.e., where mildly explosive behavior peaks). Date of Lowest Index Value: day on which the index
reaches its minimum value in the sample.
NSEI (India)
03/19/2020
03/19/2020
GDAXIP (Germany)
MIBCI3 (Italy)
IBEX (Spain)
OMXS30 (Sweden)
SPIX (Switzerland)
AXJO (Australia)
KS100 (South Korea)
South-East Asian Economies
Stock Market Index (Country) Peak Date
SSEC (China)
HSI (Hong Kong)
FTFSTA (Singapore)
01/24/2020
03/19/2020
03/19/2020
TSE50 (Taiwan)
SET100 (Thailand)
03/12/2020
N500 (Japan)
FTAS (UK)
FCHI (France)
Europe
Other Advanced Economies
DJA3 (USA)
IBX (Brazil)
02/26/2020
03/12/2020
03/12/2020
03/12/2020
03/12/2020
Other Emerging Economies
03/19/2020
03/12/2020
03/19/2020
03/16/2020
03/12/2020
03/23/2020
03/16/2020
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Figure 1: Stock Market Indices, Sequences of BSADF Test Statistics, Sequences of Critical Values, and
Periods of Mild Explosiveness (1) – South-East Asian Economies
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Notes. Shaded areas represent periods of mildly explosive behavior of at least 5 days.
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Figure 2: Stock Market Indices, Sequences of BSADF Test Statistics, Sequences of Critical Values, and
Periods of Mild Explosiveness (2) – Europe
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Notes. Shaded areas represent periods of mildly explosive behavior of at least 5 days.
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Figure 3: Stock Market Indices, Sequences of BSADF Test Statistics, Sequences of Critical Values, and
Periods of Mild Explosiveness (3) – Other Advanced Economies and Other Emerging Economies
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Notes. Shaded areas represent periods of mildly explosive behavior of at least 5 days.
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